OpenBao is an open source identity-based secrets management system. Prior to version 2.5.2, OpenBao does not prompt for user confirmation when logging in via JWT/OIDC and a role with `callback_mode` set to `direct`. This allows an attacker to start an authentication request and perform "remote phishing" by having the victim visit the URL and automatically log-in to the session of the attacker. Despite being based on the authorization code flow, the `direct` mode calls back directly to the API and allows an attacker to poll for an OpenBao token until it is issued. Version 2.5.2 includes an additional confirmation screen for `direct` type logins that requires manual user interaction in order to finish the authentication. This issue can be worked around either by removing any roles with `callback_mode=direct` or enforcing confirmation for every session on the token issuer side for the Client ID used by OpenBao.
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3 reference(s) from NVD